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THE LAW OF EXTRADITION-A LATE PHASE
"But since for one state to admit within its territories another
foreign power upon the score of exacting punishment is not practical, nor indeed convenient, it seems reasonable that a state where
the convicted 'offender lives or has taken shelter should, upon
application being made to it, either punish the demanded person
according to his demerits, or else deliver him up to be treated at
the discretion of the injured party."'

N these words Grotius declares the basic policy that underlies the law with regard to the extradition of criminals.
The right to extradite a criminal is here said to spring from
the inadmissibility of permitting a foreign power to exert
jurisdiction within the confines of a nation, a difficulty that
might prevent entirely the punishment of criminals unless
the right of extradition be secured. While the law of extradition as recognized by Grotius at any early day is essentially modern in character, he follows his usual course of
pointing to many illustrations even as far back as Biblical
days, wherein the right was asserted by the various nations
2
of ancient times.
If we were to follow the views of Grotius, we should be
led to conclude that the right to extradition is a fundamental right founded on natural law, and that it exists independent of treaties. The view, however, of the United States
Government, as is also that of many other important nations
excepting perhaps England and Italy, has been consistently
to the effect that no right of extradition exists unless such a
GRo~ius, DE JuRE BELLI ET PAts, Book II, c. 21, par. 4, p. 457 (1738).
See JuDGES, c. XX.
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right is created by treaty. Thomas Jefferson, acting as
Secretary of State, in November, 1791, declared: 3
"The delivery of fugitives from one country to
another, as practised by several nations, is in consequence of conventions settled between them, defining
precisely the cases wherein such delivery shall take
place * * *. The laws of the United States, like those

of England, receive every fugitive and no authority
has been given to our executives to deliver them up."
Several cases are on record in which extradition was
demanded by foreign powers and refused by the United
States in the.absence of a treaty. Such a request was made
by the French Government in February, 1794, and our State
Department took the position that despite the friendly relations then existing between this country and France, the
President's "legal power was too questionable to cause the
arrest to be made." I In the same way, in 1874, the United
States refused to request the extradition from Spain of one
Sharkey who was accused of murder in this country, because
of the absence of a treaty of extradition between the United
States and Spain.5 In 1876, however, Tweed was extradited
from Spain in spite of the absence of applicable treaty provisions." This was accomplished through a suggestion made
to the Spanish Government that the United States would be
pleased if Tweed were returned for trial here, but this Government then expressly stipulated that it would assume no
reciprocal obligation in the absence of a treaty. Secretary
of State Fish said, with regard to this incident: 7
"The United States has from time to time carefully avoided making requests for the surrender of
criminals, for the reason among others that it might
'Thomas Jefferson, Sec. of State, to the President, Nov. 7, 1791. Mss.
Dept. of State.
'Mr. Randolph, Sec. of State, to M. Fanchet, Feb. 7, 1794.
"Mr. Cadwalder, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Cushing, Minister to Spain,
May 11, 1875.
"Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Adee, charg6 d'affaires, Nov. 3, 1876.

Ibid.
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not be possible to reciprocate on such a matter. The
Government of Spain, in its action in this case has
appreciated the peculiarity of the case."
Similar requests to that in the Tweed case in which the
Government of the United States asked the extradition of a
criminal but expressly stipulated that it be not deemed to
undertake to reciprocate are rare in the history of this country, and only one other such instance is readily to be found,
namely, that of the extradition of Bill Tucker from Guatemala in 1884.8 As late as 1900 Mr. Hay refused to comply
with the request of the Governor of Puerto Rico that this
country demand the extradition from Spain of a- person
charged with murder; he based his refusal on the ground
that there was no extradition treaty between Spain and the
United States. 9
Presiding Judge Martin T. Manton of the Circuit Court
of Appeals in the Second Circuit, writing recently fot that
court, recognized that "The early writers of extradition held
that it was a matter of 'right' and that the nation harboring
a criminal had a 'duty' to deliver him to a requesting nation." 10 He adds: "The more modern writers, however, are
united in considering extradition not as a duty, but as a
matter of favor or of comity," 11 and expresses the opinion
that it is "now clear that apart from a treaty a state has no
duty to deliver up a person who has sought asylum within
its boundaries." 12
But even under existing extradition treaties problems
have arisen with regard to the scope of the right to extra'Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Gosling, Dec. 18, 1884; see
also report of Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to the President, in the case of
Win. J. McGraigle, Sept. 14, 1887: "During the past thirty years this Government has repeatedly refused to make a request for extradition in the absence
of a treaty, and several notable surrenders of fugitive criminals to the United
6tates, among which may be instanced that of Tweed, have been made without
any request on the part of the Government."
Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to the Governor of Puerto Rico, June 19, 1900.
See also letter of Mr. Hill, Acting Sec. of State, to Mr. Warner, Oct. 6,
1899, "It has been deemed impolitic to ask of foreign governments a favor
which this government could not grant."
" U. S. ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F. (2d) 220, 221 (C. C. A. 2d,

1934).

SIbid.
'Id. at 222.
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dition. For example, it is generally conceded that a criminal
may not be tried for a crime committed before extradition,
other than the one on account of which he has been surrendered, unless he first be given opportunity to return to the
country of his asylum. This proposition, which is considered
to be a rule of international law without regard to any
specific provision in the treaty to that effect, is as a matter
of fact incorporated in many of the extradition treaties to
which the United States is a party.13 Apparently, jurists
are concerned about preserving the right of asylum to its
fullest possible extent, as an end to social security.
A superficial view might lead one to question the soundness of this rule. If a person be brought back from a foreign
country to answer for a crime charged against him, it seems
like an inordinate waste of administrative effort and a useless racing of governmental machinery to permit him to
return to a foreign country only for the purpose of being
again extradited to be tried for another crime. Iodeed, the
view that this procedure is unnecessary and not required by
international law is taken by Westlake, 1 4 who was of the
opinion that a person might be tried for other offences than
that for which he was extradited, with the possible exception
of political offences. While the contrary view has been in
recent years the official position of the United States Government, there was a time when the State Department
insisted upon the right to try fugitives from justice for
crimes other than those for which they had been extradited.' 5
In 1877 a Royal Commission in England reported in favor
of permitting a criminal to be tried for one offence regard-6
less of the fact that he had been extradited for another.'
Most international law writers, among them Billot, T
As for example art. VII of Extradition Treaty with France-37 STAT.
1531.

"Quoted in MOORE,

EXTRADITION (1876) 215.
Case (1870); opinion of Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, supported by
his reference to Canadian Cases; Regina v. Van Aerman, 4 Upper Canada
Rep. Com. Pleas 288; Regina v. Paxton, 10 Lower Canada Jurist 212; 11
Lower Canada Jurist 352; In re Isaac Rosenbaum, 20 L. C. Jur. 165; Case of
Burley, 1 U. C. L. Jour. (N. s.) 34; Case of Worms, 22 L. P. Jur. 109.
'Winslow

" See MoORE,
2

EXTRADITION (1891) 79.
BILLOT, TRAITE DE L'ExTRADITioN 308.

THE LAW OF EXTRADITION

325

Hefter's and Field,19 have supported the contrary view. Dr.
Von Bar,20 a German internationalist, propoped a compromise in which he suggested that a criminal who was extradited for one offence might be tried for any other committed

before extradition, provided the consent of the government
who had surrendered him could be obtained. Whatever may
be the merits of these differences of viewpoint, it is obvious
that much may be said in favor of that advanced by Dr. Von

Bar. Since the decision, however, of the United States Supreme Court in the PLAcher case 21 it has been the law,
here at least, that no person who is extradited for one crime
may be tried for another committed before extradition, unless

and until he has been given opportunity to return to the
country of his asylum. The decision has been followed in
England and has been frequently cited by lower courts in

the United States.22
NETTER, DAS EUROPAISCHE VOLKERmcnT

(1881) §63.

ed. 1874) 122.
(1891) 216; 9 Rav. DE DROIT INT. (1877) 5, 16.
SUnited States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234 (1886).
S"The judicial history of the subject in the United States may be briefly
summarized. In the case of Caldwell, in 1871, judge Benedict, sitting in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York,
sustained a a demurrer by the government to a plea on the part of the prisoner
that he was extradited from Canada to the United States under the treaty of
1842 and that the offence for which he was indicted was not one of those
specified in the treaty. (U. S. v. Caldwell, 18 Blatchf. 131.)" 4 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 310. In 1873, however, Mr. Justice Fancher, sitting in
the Supreme Court of New York in Matter of La Grave, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. s.)
333, 45 How. Pr. 301 (N. Y. 1873), ruled the other way. The Supreme Court
of Kentucky in Com. v. Hawes, 13 Busch 697 (Ky. 1878) likewise anticipated
the decision of the Rauscher case in a case involving the extradition of a
criminal from Canada and the same view was followed by the Texas Court in
1881 in Blandford v. The State, 10 Tex. App. 627 (1881). Judge Hoffman,
sitting in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, applied the same rule in 1882, in United States v. Watts, 14 Fed. 130
(D. C. D. Cal. 1882). The same view was also taken in Ohio in State v.
Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273 (1883), but in 1885 Judge Acheson took a
different view in In re Miller, 23 Fed. 32 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1885). In 1886,
just before the decision in the Rauscher case, the view there enunciated was
again anticipated by Judge Deady in Ex parte Hibbs, 26 Fed. 421 (D. C. D.
Ore. 1886). The decision in the Rauscher case was followed on the Queens
Bench Division of the High Court of Justice in May, 1888, in the case of
INTERNATIONAL CODE (2d
See MooRE, ExTRADinioN

Alice Woodhall, reported in MooRE ON EXTRADITION at 240.

And also in Ex

parte Coy, 32 Fed. 911 (W. D. Tex. 1887); In the Matter of Reinitz, 7 N. Y.
Crim. Rep. 74, 39 Fed. 204 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1889) ;see also Hall v. Patterson, 45 Fed. 352 (C. C. D. N. J. 1891), where it was held that a fugitive who
was charged originally with a different offence may yet be tried for the offence
for which he was surrendered.
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The development of extradition laws would seem from
the foregoing to rest more and more upon a strict basis of
treaty provision and upon an enhanced appreciation of the
social desirability of protecting the right of asylum. Four
phases of this development are readily discernible, and it is
the fourth phase which constitutes the innovation-the subject of this paper.
The first step was taken when it was insisted that extradition both with regard to the "right" and the "duty" rests
only upon the express provisions of treaty, and that without treaty there does not exist any mutual obligation to
surrender criminals by one nation to another. We have seen
that Grotius had other views and that he insisted upon the
proposition that the mutual obligation to surrender criminals arose from natural law, but in the United States, at
least, from the very outset it has been insisted that extradition can derive only from treaty provisions.
In the second phase, the right of extradition was limited
not only to cases where treaties so provided in general, but
where, in addition, the precise crimes were named in the
treaty.2 3 So that if the enumeration was incomplete and
a person was accused of a crime not specified in the extradition treaty, the United States Government consistently
refused either to request extradition or to grant surrender.
John Bassett Moore states that:
"No case has been found in which the government of
the United States requested of another government,
with which it had a treaty, the surrender of a fugitive
for an offence not therein specified." 24
The third step in the process of limiting the right of
extradition and fostering the right of asylum consisted of
the judicial determination, finally settled in this country, in
the Rauscher case, that the accused may be tried only for
that offence for which he is surrendered, even though he may
I MOORE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION (1891) §43. See also
Mr. Macy, Sec. of State, to Mr. Parker, Aug. 28, 1856; Mr. Seward, Acting
Sec. of State, to Governor Young, April 6, 1877; Mr. Webster to Mr. Hebard,
Feb. 26, 1851.
- Id.§43.
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have committed before his extradition other offences specified in the treaty.
The result of these three steps in the development of
the law of extradition is that a person who has escaped to
the asylum of a foreign country may be extradited only if a
treaty exists between the United States and that country,
and then only if he is charged specifically with one of the
crimes set out in that treaty, and that even after his surrender he may be tried only for the specific crime for which the
extradition was requested.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit in
United States ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan,'2 5 decided on
December 31st, 1934, and further reviewed on reargument
upon amplified record on April 1, 1935, carried this process
into a fourth phase related to the law of extradition. In
achieving this result, Judge Manton wrote for the court an
illuminating and scholarly opinion in which he stressed the
history of the right of asylum and developed his decision by
logical deduction from existing treaty and statutory provisions.
In that case, the relator was indicted in New York in
December, 1930. His arrest occurred in France in July,
1933, and upon the application of the United States he was
extradited under the treaty between the two governments.
He was surrendered to the United States in April, 1934, and
brought to New York City. Upon the later recommendation
of the District Attorney of New York County he was discharged from the indictment, and enlarged upon his own
recognizance, the reason assigned being the death of a material witness without whose testimony it was impossible to
prove the crime. Within thirty days after his discharge he
was again arrested hy the United States Marshal at the
request this time of the Canadian Government, and was held
for extradition to Canada. Thereupon he sued out a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that his arrest for extradition to
Canada was illegal in that he was not afforded an opportunity in accordance with the treaty provision to return to
France. The case was complicated by the fact that the
- 74 F. (2d) 220 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); S. C., reargument, decided April 1,
1935, not yet reported.
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French Republic had signified to the Canadian Legation at
Paris that if Canada intended at some future date to request
the extradition of the prisoner from the United States, the
Republic of France would support the request. The situation was parallel if not analogous to the proposal of Dr.
Von Bar 25a nearly seventy years before, that a defendant
might be tried for a crime other than the one for which he
had been surrendered, if the surrendering nation consented
-a proposal that was something of a compromise between
the existing American rule on the one hand and the attitude,
on the other, that there was no reason why a criminal once
surrendered could not be tried for any offence of which he
was accused, regardless of that for which he was surrendered.
The extradition treaty between the United States and
France, however, contained an express provision to the effect

that:

26

"No person surrendered by either of the High contracting parties to the other shall be triable or tried
or be punished for any crime or offence committed
prior to his extradition, other than the offence for
which he was delivered up, nor shall such person be
arrested or detained on civil process for a cause accrued before extradition, unless he has been at liberty
for one month after having been tried, to leave the
country, or, in case of conviction, for one month after
having suffered his punishment or having been pardoned."
The case thus presented a novel question. It was not
whether the relator could be tried for an offence other than
the one for which he had been delivered up. He could not be
so tried. As to that the treaty was explicit. The question
was whether he could be surrendered by this Government to
another country, a situation not covered by the express language of the treaty, and for which no precedent existed.
Was the thirty-day grant of immunity sufficiently broad to
include apprehension for re-extradition to a third country?
Ia Supra note 20.
0Id. at 221.
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True, the consent of France to the surrender of the criminal
to Canada had been indicated to the Canadian Legation , but
not to the United States. There stood the treaty between
France and the United States, buttressed by the express provision for the "thirty day right to return," the settled rule
of treaty basis for extradition, and the traditional policy of
the United States for ready recognition of rights of asylum.
The court was faced with the plain corollary to this situation, namely, that in cases not governed by the treaty the
court has the duty of refusing the surrender of a criminal.
Here, as elsewhere, the problem of interpretation of an existing text was almost equivalent to the problem of creating a
new rule. The Circuit Court of Appeals followed the situation to its logical result and, sustaining the writ, wrote: 27
"If a prisoner may not be subject to arrest on
civil process after extradition from a foreign country,
by the same reasoning he cannot be arrested and held
for extradition (in a criminal offence) to a third
country."
But the court was not slow to point the way out. Quoting with approval the declaration of the Supreme Court that
"while the escape of criminals is, of course, to be greatly
deprecated, it is still most important that a treaty of this
nature between sovereignties should be construed in accordance with the highest good faith," the court makes clear
that the criminal may be deprived of this right of asylum
by the country in which that asylum is claimed: 28
"The appellant had a place of asylum in France
and could be deprived of this only by the action of
the French government. France under international
law, has the right to give him asylum or to take it
from him. Asylum necessarily means absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of another state, subject
only to the will of the state of asylum, and it must be
borne in mind that the right of the state of asylum is
' Id. at 223.
23Ibid.
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sovereign and unlimited, excepting insofar as the state
freely imposes limits on itself."

The opinion concludes with the significant observation that
while the formalities attending an extradition are purely
administrativefunctions which the accused and the state of
asylum can properly waive, the diplomatic guarantees in the
instant case-the thirty-day period of immunity-which are
accorded for the sole benefit of the accused, cannot be violated by the demanding state without the consent of the
surrendering state.
The government of the United States was not slow to
act. Since the right of asylum, as pointed out by the Circuit
Court, means "absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of
another state, subject only to the will of the state of asylum,"
the latter, France, in due course, registered its will by
addressing to the United States its consent to the surrender
of the prisoner to the new demanding government, Canada.
Within or dehors the treaty, France had the right to
grant or refuse asylum to the prisoner. She was free to
proceed independently of the treaty and to consent, as an
act of international comity, that the prisoner be delivered to
Canada. This was in full accord with the historic basis of
the right of asylum and the prisoner could not complain. 2 9
Yielding to the policies declared in its previous opinion, the
Circuit Court upon reargument directed the delivery of the
prisoner into the hands of the Canadian Government.
The law of extradition is not infrequently in the foreground of international turmoil. The front pages of the
daily newspapers are often the vehicles through which public opinion is formulated on such matters. When a stock
promoter seeks sanctuary in Greece or two sovereign states
like New York and New Jersey desire to inflict punishment
on a person accused of heinous crime, the layman is often
impatient with what he regards as technicalities whose sole
use appears to be the creation of obstacles to the punishment
'Glucksman v. Win. Henkel, 221 U. S. 508, 31 Sup. Ct. 704 (1910);
Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 5th, 1907) ; Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U. S. 311 (1924); U. S. ex rel. Donnelly v. Mulligan, decided
April 1, 1935, not yet reported.
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of crime. It is unfortunate that the public may find it'difficult to appreciate the niceties involved in the administration
of justice and the social hazards that are avoided by holding
close to the technical requirements and safeguards which
surround our criminal jurisprudence and the liberties of the
individual. While in some cases the guilty may go unpunished as a result of these refinements of the law, the security
of person and the more important ends of justice can, it is
believed, be obtained only by judicial statesmanship and
careful analysis that lead to the application of existing and
predictable rules and principles of law. The decisions of
Judge Manton in United States v. Mulligan are a noteworthy
illustration of this type of high judicial statecraft.
Louis S. POSNER.

New York City.

